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Introduction: Painful Paradoxes
The minerals and mining sector in Southern African has experienced a revival in the
past decade, with heightened levels of international, regional and occasionally
domestic investment coming in the wake of a long commodities boom, new and
promising exploration, the privatisation of some state holdings and liberalisation of
mining investment codes. Zimbabwe, a leading African gold and ferrochrome
producer in the 1990s and home to world class deposits of platinum, relatively good
infrastructure and a large pool of skills, seemed on the verge of a minerals
breakthrough. Yet less than a decade later, the Zimbabwean mining sector confronts a
hard reality: despite buoyant markets for minerals, with few exceptions local
production fell off sharply. The collapse of production in this key sector was prevented
only by a handful of new and important platinum and diamond operations – though
projects in these areas, too, moved ahead slowly given high demand.
The reality of a production crisis in the midst of boom times is the first of several
paradoxes confronting Zimbabwean mining. A second is equally unlikely: despite the
production downturn and disinvestment by several major mining houses, foreign
investment into the minerals sector actually over the course of the 2000s,
involving both a small number of new projects and multiple mergers and acquisitions.
Indeed as the economic and political crisis deepened after 2002, the number of new
players entering the troubled sector grew. A third paradox involves the nature of new
market players: while government claimed to have enabled greater black
empowerment (or ‘indigenisation’) in the sector, in practice this was rarely been
achieved in the larger documented deals. Rather, empowerment has tended to feature
non-Zimbabweans and especially SouthAfrica-based players.
These mostly unhappy paradoxes of Zimbabwean mining are complex in their
origins and closely linked with broader changing dynamics of regional cross-border
investment, political power and state policy making. In each instance South African
business and political actors have played prominent roles, their influence extending
beyond mining into diverse sectors. Some observers argue that the worsening political-
economic crisis after 2000 has disproportionately benefited South African business,
and see the South African government’s ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Robert Mugabe’s
ZANU-PF as an important component of a coordinated strategy aimed at enabling
political hegemony and economic occupation. Others suggest that South Africa is
emerging as a ‘sub-imperial’ power through such processes. Mainstream business
analysts, too, have noted the obstacles and opportunities for capital in Zimbabwe, and
acknowledge the steadfast presence of dozens of South African companies despite the
deepening crisis; they recognize, too, a certain residual protection for South African




help. It is clear for most commentators that political and economic inequities are
deepening, and are increasingly unfavourable for the large majority of Zimbabweans
and for the prospect of good public accountability around key national resources. But
the countervailing forces and factors are less sharply drawn, the longer term
implications less certain and the potential for effective policy interventions inside
Zimbabwe much less apparent. In brief, most assessments portray the experience of
incoming investment from the point of view of power without recognizing the points
of resistance to it – actual, or potential. Moreover, they do not look sufficiently beyond
the boundaries of the current extraordinary, unique crisis to consider the regulatory
controls imposed on foreign capital in the past – and perhaps in the future – by the state,
local business, working people and communities.
This research on the minerals sector aims to provide a more historically grounded
and reflective account of the evolving, complex and ambiguous experience of foreign
investment in Zimbabwe. It explores the dynamics that have shaped the restructuring
in local minerals production, and seeks to explain the contradictory tendencies seen in
investment flows and outcomes. It looks at the investment opportunities that emerged
for regional players along with the worsening sector crisis, and considers how these
openings were mediated by the Zimbabwean State, local business and civil society
interests. What emerges from the evidence is the importance of both short-term crises
and attendant market opportunities, and longer term dynamics of state institutional
decay, policy weakness and political vulnerability in the shaping of foreign investment
dynamics. While aspects of South African business-state power linkages are seen,
there is also evidence of more widely dispersed capital-state influence at regional
level. At the same time, the unmet needs of Zimbabwean stakeholders – and the
unrealised potential of the local state – emerge as factors that need to be taken into
account when assessing the durability and potency of foreign investment interests.
In the 1990s Zimbabwe was poised to become a significant force in African mining.
With its competitive mineral resources, well-maintained infrastructure, skilled
workforce and professionally-managed state regulatory institutions, the country
attracted considerable new foreign investor interest in the decade. Zimbabwe’s appeal
was strongly enhanced by the liberalisation of mining and investment regulations,
which came against the background government’s introduction of structural
adjustment policies at the start of the decade. Mining houses responded favourably.
New investment in the gold sector lifted Zimbabwe into third place among African
gold producers, and into the world top ten. New interest in ferrochrome, and a large
greenfields investment in platinum – the second largest foreign direct investment since
independence at more than half a billion US dollars – helped boost capital inflows into
mining exploration, mine commissioning and production expansion. Reflecting the
new optimism, plans for other major investments in coal and thermal power generation
were also developed, including a US$160 million Sengwa Coal Field project led by
mining major Rio Tinto. Though not matching the rapid pace of mergers and
acquisitions, exploration and new plant installations seen in regional miner Zambia
and Tanzania, Zimbabwe nonetheless seemed on the verge of a mining breakthrough
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ZIMBABWE: MINING INVESTMENT IN THE 1990s
Investment Source Company Source Country US $m Year
Hartley Platinum Mines BHP Australia 500 1998
Turk Mine Casmyn Corporation Canada 30 1995
Eureka Gold Mine Delta Gold Australia 24 1998
Indarama Gold Mine Trillion Resources Canada 15 1998
Jena Gold Mine Trillion Resources Canada 12 1991
Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation Rio Tinto UK 5 1994
Chaka Processing Plant Delta Gold Australia 3 1998
Bubi Gold Mine Anglo American SA 2 1997
Source: BusinessMap SADC FDI Database (Johannesburg) Figures do not include follow-on
investments.
But this promise was shattered by the economic and political crisis that emerged in the
late 1990s, and exploded into a direct challenge to ZANU-PF by a resurgent opposition
in the 2000 parliamentary elections. The same policy shifts associated with structural
adjustment that had helped sweeten the business climate for new mining investors had
simultaneously helped transfer a growing proportion of national income away from
working and rural communities, towards a strengthened business and political elite.
The response from a range of popular organisations in civil society was swift, and was
emboldened by growing revelations of elite corruption and the deepening decline of
ordinary Zimbabweans’ living standards. Besieged by criticism, the ZANU-PF
leadership embarked on a path of internal political realignment. This included the rapid
militarization of the ruling party, State and broader terrain of national politics, a trend
reflected in the rising prominence of so-called ‘war veterans’, state security personnel
and later, party-affiliated militias, in the senior ranks of ZANU-PF and black business.
The immediate and longer term consequences for political and economic stability were
soon evident.
Within government, a rapid erosion of bureaucratic professionalism compounded
emerging ‘rule of law’ problems as the ruling party subordinated State institutions to
the priority of its political survival and the consolidation of its leadership elite.
Government was increasingly hostile to demands for participation and dialogue from a
range of labour, business and other community interests with whom it had previously
engaged in Zimbabwe’s home grown version of social democracy. In the place of
consultative processes, renewed nationalist posturing by ZANU-PF asserted the need
for government to reassert sovereign rights over strategic natural and economic
resources. The combined impact of these dynamics was sharply negative for not only
political participation and governance, but also for the wider economy.
An economic downturn was immediate and pronounced, and worsened in
subsequent years. Production and foreign earnings in most industrial and commercial
agricultural sectors plummeted after the 2000-2002 ‘fast-track’ land redistribution
exercise, which undermined investor confidence, destabilised the supply of
agricultural inputs into an array of local processing industries, and was followed by
intermittent threats against and attacks on urban commerce and industry. Inconsistent
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fiscal and monetary policy amid declining macroeconomic indicators played havoc
with cost management, and increasingly unstable power supply, rising fuel costs and
skills flight made production planning precarious. As foreign currency reserves
dwindled amid continuing draw-downs for fuel, electricity, plant and spares,
production went into a deep slide. A seven percent decline in GDP in 2000 was
compounded by increasingly dramatic drops in following years, so that by 2005
Zimbabwe’s economy was the world's fastest-shrinking (a dubious honour it retains at
time of writing in 2008).
Government's fiscal and monetary policy became increasingly ad hoc and
unpredictable, designed to suppress exploding inflation, domestic interest rates and
exchange rate collapse. While a parallel market in foreign exchange blossomed,
private sector exporters and others within the regulatory reach of government were
compelled to trade mostly at impossibly low official exchange rates – while local input
costs inflated rapidly. For exporters the rising shortage of foreign exchange therefore
spelt disaster, not opportunity.
The mining sector, a key consumer and generator of foreign exchange and
domestic employment, was an early casualty in this emerging crisis. Currency
fluctuations, policy vacillation and skyrocketing costs were especially damaging. The
pegging of the Zimbabwe dollar exchange rate to the US dollar in a period of upward
spiralling inflation, coupled within increasing restrictions on access to foreign
exchange earnings, immediately put many mining houses’ short term viability under
pressure. The gold sector was particularly hard hit, buffeted by complicated foreign
exchange regimes managed unpredictably by the Reserve Bank. Several producers
were squeezed by this regime in 1998-2000, prompting slowdowns and closure of
several operations. These included Delta Gold’s US$24m Eureka gold mine,
commissioned in 1998, which was expected to become the country’s second largest
gold producer but was mothballed after only one year in production.
In 2000-2001, 14 gold mines were closed or placed on care and maintenance. Gold
production plummeted, with critical consequences for the broader economy: after the
collapse of commercial agriculture in the early 2000s, gold mining alone accounted for
one-third of foreign currency earnings and more than 50 percent of mineral production.
Having risen steadily after 1990 to peak at 27 tonnes in 1999, production slumped to 18
tonnes in 2001 and 12.5 tonnes in 2003, driven by chronic shortages of power, fuel,
capital inputs and skilled labour. Short term state interventions such as special
subsidies and re-jigged foreign exchange arrangements failed to halt the overall
downward trend. Other traditional mineral sectors also fell back, affected by the same
combination of rising production costs, materials shortages, degraded infrastructure,
skills flight and low realised returns due to distorted exchange rates. Copper
production collapsed from about 15,000 tonnes in 1990 to barely 2,000 in 2001; and
ferrochrome, which peaked in 1995 at nearly 300,000 tonnes, fell to 218,000 tonnes
ten years later. Meanwhile, exploration spending, a critical indicator of future
investment intentions and production potential, also suffered. It peaked in 1996 but
then dried up, with no new significant internationally financed exploration
materialising into the first decade of the new century – a period in which neighbouring
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Obstacles and Opportunities
For many established foreign mining houses the emerging indicators of economic
crisis, reflected in extensive operational challenges arising from weakened
infrastructure and unpredictability of revenue streams, severely eroded investor
confidence. Questions hanging over the security of tenure rights and the rule of law,
and the ruling party’s championing of ‘national economic sovereignty’ and the need
for greater ‘indigenisation’’or black empowerment, also loomed large. Meanwhile, a
capital boycott of Zimbabwe led by international financial institutions and
governments in response to government's effective abrogation of lending agreements,
was soon reinforced by the introduction of financial sanctions against the ruling party
and government leadership, and companies associated with them. These measures,
which also posed threats to foreign enterprises that did business politically-connected
companies in the country, further constrained mining investment capital at a time when
a sustained commodity boom – notably in minerals like platinum in which Zimbabwe
was a potential leader – was starting to take off.
Several of the larger established mining houses, as well as a number of junior
players, slowed or shut down their operations temporarily as they considered the
options for divesting and leaving the country. In the latter regard, the immediate
opportunities for Zimbabwean entrepreneurs and particularly those connected to the
political elite were mediated by the reality of western sanctions and severe local
shortages of foreign exchange. There were few options for getting around local
shortages of funding, such as offshore financing and lease-to-buy share shedding by
foreign mining houses: the kind of politically-acceptable businesspeople who would
be allowed to take up a shareholding by ZANU-PF were also likely be blacklisted by
the sanctions register – or risk such blacklisting in the future. On the other hand, it was
increasingly clear foreign companies involved in share deals benefiting blacklisted
Zimbabwean partners would be liable to penalties in home markets overseas. Such
barriers raised by sanctions to larger-scale domestic investments inside the country
were critical in opening the way for new foreign players who had both the political and
financial resources needed to ensure investment security – an arrangement which did
not preclude, in any case, a less than transparent approach to elite accumulation in a
key sector.
Into this opportunity gap stepped an array of regional players, most of them based
in South Africa and operating in neighbouring countries. A new wave of foreign
mining investment emerged, fuelled by a potent mixture of capital raised in South
African and international finance markets; the political protection (real or imagined)
afforded by the South African government and other regional political elites; a
declining appetite for non-core assets held by major mining houses; and the
availability of both established and recently developed mineral resources, particularly
some large and mostly untapped platinum deposits. Undeterred by the worsening
economic and political crisis that unfolded after 2000 and especially following the
flawed 2002 Presidential elections, new South African-led capital flows quickly led
the way in restructuring ownership in the large and medium scale mining sector.
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INVESTMENT IN A TIME OF CRISIS: KEY DEALS AFTER 2000
Investment Source Company Source Country US $m Year
Mimosa Platinum Mine Implats, Aquarius SA, Australia 30 2001
Zimplats Selous Mine Implats SA 225 2002-05
Independence Gold Mines Metallon SA 15 2002
Unki Platinum Mine Anglo Platinum SA 300 2003
Bindura Nickel Corporation Mwana Africa UK/SA 8 2003
Murowa Diamonds Rio Tinto plc UK 61 2004
Freda Rebecca Gold Mine Mwana Africa UK/SA 2.5 2005
Anotable development was the rapid growth of platinum production with the injection
of large financial and technical resources by SouthAfrica’s Impala Platinum (Implats),
the world’s second largest platinum producer, into the Zimbabwe Platinum Mines
(Zimplats) venture formerly controlled by Australia’s Delta Gold. Anglo American’s
platinum division developed plans for the major Unki project, which grew in projected
costs from US$90m to more than $300m as the plans were scaled up. The smaller
Mimosa project was also funded. Partly in attempts to deflect financial risk costs
associated with working in the increasingly unstable country, industry players actively
marketed Zimbabwe as home to the world’s second largest, relatively low-cost and
untapped platinum resources. South African platinum miners’ enthusiasm for their
new Zimbabwean operations was reflected in the regular revision upwards of project
scale and costs – as well as the actual delivery of committed funds.
But the platinum sector, as well as a new venture in diamonds developed by UK’s
giant Rio Tinto plc, was the exception in an emerging pattern involving new
investment deals. In the 2000s, mining restructuring by means of investment focused
mainly on mergers and acquisitions that involved the transfer of asset ownership
an accompanying renewal and boosting of production. Wholly or substantially
new projects resulting from foreign investment were the exception, and Chamber of
Mines and industry observers pointed to the of new project implementation as
a worrying dominant trend since 2000. If the fire sale of assets by divesting mining
houses had seen the arrival of new occupants, the latter undertook little renovation of
their new real estate. For the most part, the injection of new capital into existing
projects was aimed at covering mounting losses and sustaining below-capacity
production, a trend that continued to 2008.
The profile of the new owners was also notable. Few of the assets traded in the
2000s directly involved Zimbabwean businesses as leading or major partners – at least
not in any transparently structured, openly contracted manner. And here it is important
to specify: in this study, mining projects acquired by legally disputed means – for
example, occupation or seizure – are not considered, although they are few and to date
do not include larger mines; nor are new stakes acquired through silent shareholdings
that are not publicly acknowledged, and whose ownership is typically cloaked from
scrutiny by means of proxy shareholders, numbered companies, offshore holding
vehicles, etc. These latter forms of empowerment include investment vehicles of the
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institutional control and benefit are difficult to detect. In these cases, precise
documentation of ownership has tended to take second place to speculation and
rumour in the realm of public perception. While it is widely acknowledged that
individual participants in transactions have derived a good deal of their influence from
their political links, it is often difficult to establish whether they are acting primarily as
proxies for wider interests (including political parties and their commercial holdings)
or in their individual capacities – indeed, this attribute may change over time.
Even in this context, and especially in the prevailing political environment
characterised by nationalist claims to historical assets and resources, the relatively
junior role assumed by Zimbabwean businesspeople in the new mining investments of
the 2000s has been notable. Beyond the new platinum and diamond ventures, key
investors have primarily included South African-based blacks working in
collaboration with white SouthAfrican interests, international financial support and in
one important case, regionally-based black businesspeople including a smattering of
Zimbabweans. Regional ‘black empowerment’ figures have figured prominently.
South Africa’s high profile empowerment entrepreneur Mzi Khumalo became a
Zimbabwean player when his Metallon mining group acquired Independence Gold
Mines in 2002, in a deal that saw the marginalisation of Metallon’s prospective
Zimbabwean partners and led to a series of bitter lawsuits by the Zimbabweans against
Khumalo.
More significant have been the linked investments by Mwana Africa, a company
that started as a consortium of businessmen from the region and brought together
politically-connected interests in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana and South Africa, with elements of white mining and
finance capital. London-registered, South Africa-based Mwana bills itself as a ‘Pan-
African resources’ company and ‘the first African-owned, African-managed’ mining
business to list on the prestigious Alternative Investments Market at the London Stock
Exchange. Among its founding directors was Oliver Chidawu, a wealthy
Zimbabwean businessman with strong political connections to the ruling ZANU-PF.
Headed by DRC national and former Anglo American executive, Kalaa Mpinga,
Mwana’s growth strategy depended heavily on asset acquisition, often in locations
where good relations with government were key to securing access. This included
Zimbabwe, where the company bought a 53 percent stake from Anglo American in
2003 in the large Bindura Nickel operation in the wake of simmering conflict among
local business factions for control of the nickel miner. Some speculated that Mwana
acted as a leveraging peace broker at Bindura, bringing onto the reconstituted Bindura
board a ZANU-PF stalwart, Retired Air Chief Marshall Josiah Tungamirai, and
prominent state-linked businessman, Muchadeyi Masunda. In 2005 Mwana added
AngloGold Ashanti’s Freda Rebecca mine to its stable and took over Cluff Mining
Zimbabwe, part owner of a dormant mine and undeveloped nearby ground. As part of
the Freda Rebecca sale agreement approved by government, Mwana undertook to sell
a 15 percent stake to a Zimbabwean investor, although this had still not happened by
2007. More recently, Mwana sought to raise working capital and bridge financing for
the troubled Bindura and Freda Rebecca operations through a £25m share placement in
London. A significant new venture under Bindura Nickel was planned to extend the
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Meanwhile, other SouthAfrican-based ‘empowerment’ focused companies hunted
for deals. Mmakau Mining, headed by Bridgette Radebe, wife of South African
Transport Minister Jeff Radebe, took over Eureka gold mine from Placer Dome SAand
promised to bring in a Zimbabwean black empowerment junior partner. African
Rainbow Minerals, controlled by Patrice Motsepe – reputedly South Africa’s first
black billionaire, and brother to Bridgette Radebe – announced it was considering
opportunities in coal and platinum. In addition, many smaller operations indicated they
were considering finding Zimbabwean partners to open up access to the faltering or
mothballed assets that had become undervalued.
More recently, China emerged as a key minerals player. In 2006 a $1.3bn contract
for coal mining and thermal generation construction was negotiated with China
Machine Building International, and a chrome mining partnership was established
between Zimbabwe’s failing state owned Zimbabwe Mining Development
Corporation (ZMDC) and Beijing’s Star Communications, bankrolled by Chinese
funds. Then in 2007 a controlling stake in the Zimbabwe Mining and Smelting
Company (Zimasco), the leading Zimbabwean ferrochrome producer and fifth largest
in the world, was sold to Sinosteel for $200m in cash. Other Chinese deals, including
Duration Gold’s takeover of tailings and older gold mines in 2005, also emerged. All
have been oiled by China’s relative ease of access to substantial finance and
technology, higher tolerance for political risk in a country whose government
increasingly has depended on Chinese diplomatic support, and growing hunger on the
part of Chinese production for industrial minerals. Public encouragement by the
Zimbabwean government of Chinese investment as an alternative to the politically-
constrained markets of the west signalled the appearance of a new pattern of mine
financing. However the local implications of such flows and the resulting deals – for
other sector producers and potential investors and suppliers, professionals and workers
– were unclear; as were the performance criteria, royalty and other payment conditions
that may have been imposed by government as part of the agreements of sale and
contract.
Similar questions over the degree and direction of local benefit as well as the public
accountability of foreign investors, apply to most of the market entrants who arrived in
the 2000s. A deepening pattern of marginalisation of mining communities,
independent business entrepreneurs and indeed state regulatory and producer agencies
themselves, has seemingly become entrenched. There is scant evidence of a state-
based strategy to systematically encourage and extract public value from new foreign
mining investment. In contrast, recent policy-making focus has typically been devoted
to the question of individual ownership stakes, rather than matters of performance,
production, reinvestment and other crucial, more broadly developmental issues that
are vital to the revival and growth of the mining sector.
ZANU-PF’s high-risk mining investment strategy has in some ways been the outcome
of a deeply flawed approach to empowerment – or ‘indigenisation’, in the
Zimbabwean political lexicon – that emerged in the market reform years of the 1990s.
Elite-driven partisan ‘indigenisation’ measures have fuelled intra-elite conflict,
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redistribution and employment strategies, and raised both foreign investor risks and
local investor financing costs. Another key casualty has been the state’s own
regulatory institutions. In a painful paradox, the most recent attempts to rein-in the
mining sector have involved the consolidation, not the reforming and restructuring, of
policies that actively the majority by removing from public access and
accountability the proceeds of mineral resources. In more literal terms of ownership
‘indigenisation’ according to citizenship, the results have been no less disappointing.
If a stable and growing minerals sector was a short-lived legacy of the 1990s, a
more problematic and enduring one was the pattern of mine ownership. The persistent
exclusion of local participation in most large scale mining, with the exception of
government’s own ill-fated interventions through its parastatal ZMDC, prompted
sporadic but mostly unsystematic initiatives by government aimed at mining
empowerment. The need for empowerment had been recognized since the 1990s by the
Chamber of Mines, the main representative body for mine owners. But few cases of
empowerment were both enabled and tolerated by government. One initiative
involved Mutumwa Mawere, a ‘self-made’ indigenous mining magnate with links to
the ZANU-PF leadership. He used creative financial restructuring to become the
controlling shareholder in Shabanie Mashaba asbestos Mines in the late 1990s. His
deal was anointed and celebrated by government – indeed Mawere was seen by some
commentators as closely linked to senior government officials, who may have
facilitated his sudden rise in the wake of little experience – and President Mugabe and
other ZANU-PF leaders called on aspiring black entrepreneurs to take control in the
commanding heights of the mining sector, albeit with little apparent response.
At the time, Mawere spoke of expanding his interests via financing facilities
designed to act as an indigenisation trust for privatised state assets and other targets.
However, the murky politics of competing ruling party players and financing issues
intervened, and the mining magnate’s acquisitions soon fell into financial problems, its
collapse ensured by the withdrawal of political support from the State. The one-time
empowerment hero, recast by government as a suspect businessmen, later chose self-
imposed exile in South Africa under threat of arrest in Zimbabwe, where government
seized his Shabanie assets. Some saw Mawere's fall from grace as a sign of a ‘crony
capitalist’ deal gone wrong.
Other smaller-scale efforts at indigenisation were more successful, and involved
extensive artisanal works in different locations. However, none of these grew into
large operations and occasionally their operators too were harassed by government
officials, who accused miners of violating exchange control regulations by smuggling
gold and other minerals; of operating illegally without permits; and other offences.
‘Bottom-up’ empowerment by the small-scale sector therefore met with continuous
challenges. Small scale miners like gold panners were typically trashed by
government, rather than celebrated and encouraged, an approach that would later be
embodied in a wholesale state-led attack on small scale operators labelled ‘Operation
Chikorokodza Chapera’.
Beyond a small elite of aspiring mining entrepreneurs and a larger grouping of
small scale and informal sector miners, government and empowerment groups failed
to mobilise a popular base among a wider constituency – particularly among
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were victims of a double assault from the economic downturn and politically-
motivated violence. With ZANU-PF’s intense militarization of politics in the early
2000s, workers and workers organisations were identified by government and the
ruling party as potential enemies. The ruling party was determined to prevent its rural
political base from being occupied and reorganized by its political critics, and soon
violence and intimidation was unleashed on mineworkers, their union (the 10,000
strong Associated Mineworkers of Zimbabwe-AMZ), mining compounds and
surrounding communities. Mineworkers, already hard-hit in the 1990s by
mechanisation and restructuring (mining employment had dropped from 83,000 in
1995 to less than 50,000 in 1999 ), soon suffered more direct and unambiguous forms
of injury.
In 2001, workers on several mines were physically assaulted, harassed and
otherwise strong-armed by members of the self-styled Zimbabwe Federation of Trade
Unions, a ZANU-PF-inspired ‘trade union’ led by war veteran Joseph Chinotimba,
whose members seemed to consist mostly of ‘war vets’, youth militias and
unemployed party-linked youths. These attacks, encouraged by government, led to the
extortion of funds from workers and mine owners; the displacement of the AMZ’s
organising capacity and access to its dues-paying members; and the disabling of the
MDC’s political and organisational support in mining compounds. Reports of
violence, destruction of property and theft were common during these incursions,
which thoroughly destabilised industrial relations and community life in several
different mining areas in 2001-02, and set the stage for the collapse of a number of
small and medium-scale mining operations in subsequent years. Many mining
communities were left to limp along without further investment in the context of
scaled-back or closed operations, a rapidly declining social economy and under threat
of further violence from government-aligned pseudo-unions. In succeeding years,
mineworkers and mining communities have not been meaningfully included in State-
backed processes of empowerment policy making.
In the early 2000s, government’s approach to empowerment took a new direction in
response to the changing political and economic environment. The commercial farm
invasions and subsequent breakdown in enforcing the rule of law – particularly around
property rights – opened up the promise of new avenues for asset acquisition by
aspiring, politically-connected entrepreneurs. At the same time, competition over
these assets was fuelled and mediated by conflict among factions within the ruling
party leadership which emerged to vie for the right to succeed President Mugabe in the
medium term. After 2000, black business groups’ empowerment deals were
increasingly tied in with, and dependent upon, powerful political factions in the party –
especially those with military and security connections who were in the ascendant in
this period. Since the securing of new economic assets was perceived as having direct
bearing on these factional struggles, empowerment initiatives became increasingly
hotly-contested, ad hoc and unstable.
The mining sector became a critical battleground for the hearts, minds and
pocketbooks of key business and political constituencies related to ZANU-PF’s
internal struggle for power. This unsettled period was punctuated by increasingly
26
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public intra-elite disputes, sometimes mediated in contradictory ways by different
institutions of the State and ruling party. Where politically-affiliated businesspeople
fell foul of the dominant party faction around President Mugabe – for example,
Mutumwa Mawere – they were sometimes harshly treated, their assets expropriated
and their legal, financial and personal security called into question. In other instances,
including prominent businessman and former Army Commander Solomon Mujuru
(and husband of Vice-President Joyce Mujuru), President Mugabe struggled to contain
his colleagues’ business and political aspirations, and used divide-and-rule tactics
among aspirant political businesspeople to keep rivals in check. But none of this
provided the vision needed for rethinking and reordering the beleaguered mining
sector in ways that both sustained production and benefits flow from it, and attracted
new, sufficiently resourced investors. While government invited public discussion
with mining industry stakeholders on a black empowerment policy in 2004, there was
little subsequent progress despite interest from mining houses, the Chamber of Mines
and even the South African government, which offered to play a supporting role in the
development of laws, regulation and support mechanisms for small scale and
empowerment-focused deals.
Instead, there was an effective competitive stalemate within political and business
circles that was reflected in the failure of several empowerment efforts under
government. Targets in this ad-hoc campaign involved some of the larger foreign
mining houses, including the platinum projects of Anglo American and Zimplats, and
gold miner Metallon, responsible for about fifty percent of the country’s annual gold
output. Each faced demands that they take on local partners whose key assets appeared
to include local political connections and influence. But without a clear and
enforceable policy and state supervisory capacity, and with government rendered
vulnerable by its desperate need for foreign exchange-yielding mineral exports, even
the limited goals of the state’s empowerment demands were largely deflected.
Anglo American, having signalled its intention of divesting from most of its
Zimbabwean assets to concentrate on larger projects, was an early target for local
investors – yet most of its more expensive nickel and gold assets on sale ended up
going to non-Zimbabwean companies. An exception was its Zimbabwe Alloys group
of chrome mines, where production had levelled off and was downward by the early
2000s, which was sold in 2005 to a ‘broad-based indigenous consortium’ of
Zimbabweans. In the case of its valuable Unki platinum project, however, Anglo
sought to hold on to its undeveloped assets in the face of government insistence that it
cede a 15-20 percent stake to government-nominated locals. The project moved ahead,
albeit slowly, with Anglo continuing to resist government pressure and insisting on
ownership autonomy, while scaling up its promised investment from an initial estimate
of $92m, to $300m. By 2007 it was stockpiling ore on-site in advance of building up a
production plant – thereby providing another incentive to government for approval of
the project's terms of investment.
At Zimplats, owner Implats’ engagement with three successive sets of local
partners nominated by government each collapsed because the company required
bankable financial commitments from any future partner. In lieu of suitable local
partners, Zimplats proposed domestic participation by means of the listing of some
shares on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, but government rejected this. Finally the
28
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company chose to negotiate terms for the recognition of ‘empowerment credits’
through partial ceding of its land claim and recognition of current and future social
investments. While a deal was struck with government in 2006, empowerment
activists continued to call for additional concessions from the local mining sector’s star
performer.At the same time Implats moved ahead with substantial new investment into
Zimplats and was quietly supported by the SouthAfrican government, which sought to
protect a leading South African mining house in one of its primary production
locations.
In a third case, Mzi Khumalo’s Metallon immediately encountered empowerment
problems of its own after taking over Independence Mines from Lonmin in 2002.
Having courted a Zimbabwean joint venture empowerment partner, Stanmarker
Mining, leading up to the acquisition, Metallon later sidelined Stanmarker and
acquired Independence directly. It later sold a 30 percent share to Manyame
Corporation, a new empowerment partner, but that deal also ended in conflict over the
terms of sale. Each spurned empowerment group launched a lawsuit against the South
African company; but the Metallon shareholding was not diluted by incorporation of
local partners. Metallon’s plans for expansion of its Zimbabwe activities, projected to
triple its gold output over five years through an investment of up to US$100m, were put
on hold.
In contrast, one notable successfully engineered empowerment deal involved the
Murowa Diamonds project in 2004-05. The new mine is 78 percent owned by Rio
Tinto plc with junior partner RioZim, a Zimbabwe-listed company whose 56 percent
majority shareholding held by Rio Tinto plc was ceded to Zimbabwean investors as
part of the Murowa deal. But this market-leverage empowerment option was not
favoured by government or its empowerment activist allies – likely because it favoured
the established, non-partisan business interests which retain good access to domestic
financial markets. For the State, empowerment driven by the market risks undermining
strategies that focus primarily on consolidating patronage and political power in the
process of asset transfer.
In reality, following Mawere’s asbestos deal in the late 1990s, very few new
significant empowerment deals involving contractually structured, transparently
implemented partnership transactions with local consortia were successfully
concluded. When it did take place, black empowerment primarily involved regional
African players, not an established coterie of Zimbabwean miners. For the most part,
Zimbabwean mining empowerment interests saw the State – not the market – as the
key route to asset acquisition. The State, however, was also an increasingly divided,
conflicted, and bankrupt entity; with its pathology exhibited in increasingly alarming,
and potentially destructive, ways.
In 2006, a dramatic diamond rush in eastern Zimbabwe highlighted the reality of
irregular state intervention, growing high-level corruption and a swelling crisis in the
State mining sector. The focus of attention fell primarily on the Marange district of near
Mozambique, where diamonds were discovered in mid 2006; and on the politically
contested River Ranch mine near the southern border with South Africa. Soon there
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mining operations, and a rise in unregulated diamonds sales that possibly fed into an
emerging ‘blood diamonds’ trade. In the case of River Ranch mine, some speculated
about the role of Zimbabwe’s political and military elite and its DRC counterpart in
enabling a conduit for DRC diamonds through Zimbabwe to diamond factories and
international traders in SouthAfrica.
By December 2006 the World Diamond Council (WDC) called for an investigation
of the Zimbabwean industry, citing allegations of smuggling and unclear certification
procedures of exported diamonds. In response, in early 2007 the Kimberley Process
(KP) announced that some diamond exporters in Zimbabwe were under investigation
and that the Zimbabwe government was cooperating with KP efforts. On its part,
government adopted different and sometimes seemingly contradictory approaches,
both alleging smuggling and corruption by Zimbabwean officials and foreign traders,
and denying irregularities involving leading players and government members. But
soon familiar patterns of interlinked state and ruling party involvement and intrigue
emerged. Important questions were raised around the controlling interests and the
main beneficiaries of Zimbabwe’s flourishing undocumented ‘grey diamonds’ sector.
The diamond rush of 2006 was chaotic from the outset, beset by land invasions by
informal miners, repeated legal challenges by claim title holders who had been pushed
aside by the state, the effective crumbling of mandated state structures tasked with
dealing with mining development and marketing, and the increasingly murky
involvement of illegal traders, dealers and ruling party and state officials. In Marange,
Africa Consolidated Resources (ACR), a UK-based mining house with local
shareholders, was the claim titleholder of the largely undeveloped diamond fields. But
when new discoveries by local residents became known in mid 2006,ACR’s claim was
quickly overrun by thousands of local and regional fortune hunters, following
government encouragement. The State had publicly disputed ACR’s claim rights, and
then refused to restore security and order through the removal of invading informal
diggers – who grew to as many as 20,000 in a short period of time. Instead, government
invited invaders to occupy the land on condition that uncovered diamonds would be
sold to the Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ), the state
institution entrusted with overseeing most minerals sales. In September 2006 Deputy
Minister of Mines Tinos Rusere personally visited the digging sites, urging on the
informal miners.
Government was laying the conditions for potential disaster. On the ground, the
buying prices offered by MMCZ were very uncompetitive with those paid by foreign
buyers who had descended on the area. MMCZ also appeared to be short on funds with
which to purchase stones. As a result there was a flood of sales into the unregulated
black market and its associated trading networks, with no benefit whatsoever accruing
to the State, and a collapse of controls on the origin of stones circulating in the country.
Government itself speculated that as much as US$300m in stones could not be
accounted for through legal marketing channels; others put the sum much higher. The
scale of the chaos was reflected in the fact that no one knows for certain the real extent
of the loss.
In a bid to stop further haemorrhaging, state security forces moved onto the fields in
November 2006, brutally evicting the diggers and imposing a seal on the area. There
were soon allegations that soldiers, too, were digging in the secured zone, and that
32
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senior government and military people were implicated. At the same time, ACR was
formally deprived of its claim by MMCZ (which also seized diamonds held by ACR),
prompting an ACR court challenge, demands for return or compensation of seized
diamonds, and a complaint to the KP about the chaos that had ensued at Marange.
Government was undeterred. In January 2007 Minister of Mines Amos Midzi granted
the ZMDC a license for the Marange fields, despite public objections from
independent and senior government officials (including Reserve Bank Governor
Gideon Gono) that the ZMDC entirely lacked the capacity for the undertaking.
Speculation was rife that the ZMDC’s low capacity could be used by government as an
excuse to permit politically-connected private firms, rumoured to include Chinese
investors, to take over the Marange operations in partnership with government.
Government’s decision to directly undertake diamond mining operations was
especially troubling given the ZMDC’s failed record in previous ventures including
gold, copper and tin mines – several of which had closed under allegations of
mismanagement. Importantly, the authorisation of state-managed ZMDC’s mining
license came in the context of new high profile criminal cases of diamond smuggling
involving senior government officials and politically-connected individuals. Those
arrested and charged included a government department director (since deceased), and
the son of the CEO of Zimbabwe Defence Industries, a security-dominated firm active
in the DRC and allegedly involved in illegal resource exploitation there.
Allegations of smuggling and corruption at Marange were compounded by
separate questions over River Ranch mine, owned by former Zimbabwe National
Army General Solomon Mujuru and other figures linked to senior ruling party circles.
River Ranch – seen by the WDC as potentially being in violation of KP certification
rules – refuted the allegations and denied exporting diamonds. But in a further twist
which highlighted the ruling party factional disputes underlying mining sector
empowerment, a competing set of empowerment interests alleged in May 2007 that the
United Nations Development Programme and World Bank were facilitating diamond
smuggling at the mine. The two agencies had recently assisted River Ranch in a
capitalisation exercise. The allegations were made by Bubye Minerals, whose
directors included senior ZANU-PF-linked rivals to the Mujuru group. Explicitly
adding politics into the business mix, Bubye disingenuously argued that the impact of
international sanctions could be offset by legally-sanctioned diamond sales managed
by Bubye. On its part, the UNDP denied complicity in smuggling and launched its own
investigations.
In January 2007 the Parliament of Zimbabwe’s Committee on Mines, Energy and
the Environment and the KPinitiated separate investigations in the wake of the WDC’s
allegations. The parliamentary committee, under the chairmanship of an opposition
party member, held in camera sessions in April. The activities of senior politicians and
officials would be included in its work, the committee insisted, and not only small-
scale miners whom government had chastised for flocking to the black market. A KP
review team visited Zimbabwe in May and June, and reported good cooperation from
government and industry stakeholders. The review team later cleared the government
diamonds sector regulators of allegations of improper documentation and potential
wrong doing, in a report which failed to deal adequately with either widely reported
instances of continuing illegal mining and trading in Marange, or more importantly,
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the role of government-linked individuals and security agencies in illegal mining
practices.
Some domestic observers argued that at least one critical lesson from the diamond
rush fiasco was made clear. Wrote one commentator: ‘our government will console
itself with the thought that diamonds extracted from Marange have not been used to
finance conflict. That does not make them clean because the gems have become a
means by which senior government officials and their cronies have continued to
acquire illicit wealth’. The source of the diamond fields mess, the writer continued,
was government itself, and even if the State had ‘mobilised to clean up the mess in an
exercise meant to portray government as working for the betterment of the country’, it
was a mess of its own making, created in the tarnished name of indigenisation and
empowerment.
Government’s response to the unfolding investigations and reports was
contradictory. While acknowledging media reports of public and private diamonds
corruption, President Mugabe later insisted that the strategic value of the diamond
sector necessitated that government alone should mine and market diamonds. In April
2007 he called for tighter government control over both the diamond and gold sectors.
Crucially, he did not specify the means by which weak and allegedly corrupt public
institutions overseeing mining could be strengthened to enable more positive
outcomes. There was clear need for this, according to State industry sources.
Continuing feuds among the Ministry of Mines, Ministry of Empowerment and
Indigenisation and the Reserve Bank complicated the terrain of regulation and
particularly, the implementation of ‘empowerment from above’. Policy was often
enforced on an unpredictable, case-by-case basis. In practice, different sections of
government exhibited competing sets of expectations around indigenisation – from
private accumulation for new businesspeople to the development of local
infrastructure, rebuilding of metals exports industries and provision of foreign
exchange to the State. Mining houses and prospective community beneficiaries
struggled to understand and negotiate a way through a thorny complex of personalities
and power interests, while state officials themselves sometimes sought to undermine
colleagues in other public sector institutions. New steps taken towards regularising
state administrative control over indigenisation only threatened to institutionalise and
exacerbate these problems.
In May 2007 government announced it would introduce an ‘Indigenisation and
Economic Empowerment Bill’ to guide indigenisation objectives and procedures in all
productive sectors. Following its fast-tracking in parliament where it was passed in
September 2007, the Act was signed into law by President Mugabe in March 2008.
This act of legal closure failed to subdue swelling controversy, which first erupted with
the surprise announcement in early 2006 by Mines and Minerals Development
Minister Amos Midzi that government would move quickly to acquire a 51 percent
stake in foreign owned mining assets. The 51 percent, he said, would include an
uncompensated expropriated stake of 25 percent. Twenty percent of the stakes in
question would be acquired within two years, with the state's holding rising to 40
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government-nominated Zimbabwean investors would benefit from access to
government’s newly acquired shareholdings, and future new investments would be
required to include state or indigenous participation from the outset.
Local mining houses and the Chamber of Mines, both of which had engaged in
consultations with government around empowerment issues, were not the only ones
surprised. South African miners and their home government were also caught
unawares. As early as 2005, reports indicated, South Africa had pledged to support
Zimbabwean small and medium-scale miners with the long term objective of nurturing
a basis for later expansion into larger mining operations requiring greater financial and
managerial inputs. As part of the bilateral discussions Zimbabwe and South Africa
mooted an empowerment-related exchange programme in late 2005 in which the latter
offered to assist with policy making inputs, leading to the implementation of a mining
indigenisation and empowerment charter.
But by 2006 the priority of elite accumulation, not sustainable policy making
leading to integrated growth in the sector, had been reasserted in the form of
government’s new empowerment draft amendments. Any progress towards a more
redistributive, inclusive approach achieved in discussion with the Chamber of Mines
or through bilateral negotiation (for example, Zimplats’ 2006 ‘social credits’
agreement with government) was called into question. Industry insiders spoke of a
collapse of investor confidence, and the certainty of new punitive risk premiums on
project capital raised in foreign markets.
Soon after the was promulgated
on 7 March 2008, politics again seemed to overtake the practice of policy
implementation. On March 29, 2008 Zimbabweans voted in landmark elections which
resulted in the electoral defeat of ZANU-PF by the opposition Movement for
Democratic Change (MDC). Although a period of extreme instability ensued, leading
to a series of settlement negotiations that will likely result in an uneasy government of
‘national unity’, it appeared that the political ground underpinning recent
empowerment policy making had shifted once again. There was little doubt by
industry and political observers that a government including MDC members would
dispense with the new empowerment regulations; indeed, it was reported that MDC
officials had secretly met in July 2008 with representatives of Anglo American, to
discuss new threats against the company’s platinum assets coming from foreign
mining players with links to the ZANU-PF government. The MDC publicly warned
that questionable investment deals of recent years would be reviewed – and overturned
if discovered to be prejudicial to the national interest. There was no mention of how
such deals would be scrutinized and contested; by which legal means; and through
which force effect would be given to findings. Neither was there recognition of the
growing presence of new regional players with powerful political allies in
neighbouring countries – and of the need to develop new ways of disciplining their
activities for new, mutually-beneficial outcomes. These could well be the tasks of the
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Conclusions: Old Patterns of Power, New Questions
In the midst of a resurgence in international minerals prices and rising interest in
African mining, Zimbabwe stands as a rare case where proven resources of valuable
commodities, capacity in infrastructure and comparatively good mining skills do not
necessarily result in significant production growth. Rather, the opposite has occurred:
most key sectors, including gold, ferrochrome and copper, and with the exception of
platinum group metals, fell off in the early 2000s and currently show little sign of
recuperation. The diamond rush of 2006 further undermined confidence:
government’s strategic nurturing of chaos in the diamond fields, its apparent toleration
if not involvement in massive corruption and its inability to provide predictable
political and regulatory leadership, only raised new questions around the role of the
State and ruling party in the exploitation of national resources for public benefit.
Zimbabwe’s mining sector provides an important perspective on the changing
patterns of foreign investment in the country during a period of crisis. In important
ways, mining in Zimbabwe represents an atypical investment scenario in the region in
the 2000s, because of the country’s relatively negative risk profile and the multiple
high barriers to entry for local capital and the State, due to mining’s high capital
intensity. At the same time its dilemma raises critical questions concerning the
engagement and management of large scale foreign investors by the state and national
actors who are comparatively vulnerable in terms of financial and technical capacity.
Which institutions, instruments and policy initiatives, for example, are critical – or
corrosive – for sustaining investment and enabling greater local benefit?
A series of public policy failures played a key role in dampening growth and in
distorting the nature of restructuring and investment that did take place in the crisis
years after 2000. Mining investment in the past decade has been overdetermined by a
high risk political and economic environment that was compounded in more recent
years by weakened State policy making and regulatory institutions, and the heightened
impact of ruling party elite factional conflict in shaping economic and particularly
empowerment interventions. Structural adjustment in the 1990s and militarization in
the 2000s gutted much of the professional bureaucratic capacity of the state, and made
policy making and implementation more ad hoc, reactive, unpredictable and narrowly
partisan. With regard to the critical question of empowerment and participation, for
example, Zimbabwe saw the emergence of elite-driven approaches rather than the
articulation of a policy seeking the sustainable transfer of strategic production into
accountable hands. The recent changes to the mining indigenisation and
empowerment policy starkly reflected government's precarious capacity and
equivocal will to pursue a transparent, more widely beneficial approach to
indigenisation.
The decline of the State’s central regulatory and market role, built up in the first
decade of independence through institutions like the ZMDC and Minerals Marketing
Commission, and the economic crisis’s impact on access to capital and investment,
rendered the Zimbabwean mining sector vulnerable to externally-driven asset trading
in the local market. Government’s elite-driven, seemingly approach to
empowerment was poorly designed to confront and discipline new activity in the
sector, as some established players divested and new entrants sought bargains. In the
context of the regional political and economic prominence of South Africa, and that
compradorial
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country’s willingness to provide political, technical and financial support for its
companies’ cross-border activities, the Zimbabwe government’s control over a key
remaining productive sector appeared imperilled.
The capital intensive, long-term nature of investment and production in the mining
sector has also been a critical factor shaping the restructuring process in recent years,
and has limited the effectiveness of legal and other empowerment measures. Perhaps
more than any other sector, large scale mining is dependent upon access to large capital
stocks and continuing capital flows for high-cost skills, imported inputs, processing
and marketing; moreover, most of these costs are denominated in hard currency. Since
the late 1990s, neither the State, nor local finance markets, nor domestic business have
had access to sufficient funds to either buy into larger mining operations or maintain
them efficiently if they were acquired. Western economic sanctions on leaders of the
state-linked empowerment business sector have been highly effective in blocking
access to capital for deployment inside the country. On the other hand, in a period of
severe and worsening foreign exchange shortages, mining’s prominence as a foreign
exchange earner has risen, and it has been in government’s strategic economic interest
to ensure that minerals exports are encouraged, even if this has meant that private
sector beneficiaries of mineral production remain primarily foreigners. The door was
opened to the arrival of new players with both access to capital and sufficient political
resources to resist local factional demands for inclusion.
State empowerment strategies that assumed a scenario of low-cost transfers of
ownership, such as happened in the commercial agricultural sector, therefore failed to
recognize the specificity of production in the mining sector. Empowerment by
prescription alone would not be feasible. The ironic outcome for aspiring local
entrepreneurs soon became clear: in reality, there was less effective indigenisation in
the mining sector (not counting secret, unverifiable changes of ownership that may be
politically linked) in the militantly nationalist period of the 2000s, than in the previous
two decades of independence.
Other more inclusive approaches to mining development, which might have
helped build consensus leading to the establishment of more effective constraints on
mining investors, required a less autocratic approach to policy making and investment
than seen in the past decade.
Since the late 1990s, government’s policy engagement with both the established
black business community and most sections of civil society has been profoundly
negative. Notions of economic participation linked to systematic redistribution were
dropped, and along with them, opportunities for building a broad social coalition and
strategy for reclaiming economic and social rights in the mining sector.
‘Empowerment’ became widely understood to mean the enrichment of the political
and military elite from both Zimbabwe and neighbouring countries.
In sum, government failed to develop a clear and inclusive strategy for class
formation beyond a very narrow (and probably shrinking) politically-linked elite. The
prospects for the development of a broader political front that could confront the issue
of foreign asset transfers evaporated.
Partly as a consequence, large scale mining operations have remained relatively
undented by pressure and demands for inclusion and accountability. The largest
mining investments in the past decade, including those led by Implats, Unki, Rio Tinto,
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Mwana Africa and Metallon – and more recently, various Chinese companies – have
deflected most demands emerging from government-linked individuals and investor
groups. The decline of cooperative consultation with government has diminished the
state’s flexibility and transparency in dealing with a changing sector and positively
influencing developments within it. By extension, this dynamic has also further
marginalised community and labour stakeholders from policy making and processes.
International investors have remained in control of the roll-out of restructuring, which
has witnessed the simultaneous shedding of local assets and the ‘cherry-picking’ of
preferred projects, on sale at cut-rate prices. The recent wave of Chinese merger and
acquisition investment, the precise terms of which are not entirely clear, is the latest
reflection of a worrying trend in finance-led asset shifts in which local stakeholders
have been marginalised.
Do these trends amount to a form of mining sub-imperialism, led by South African
capital, as some researchers have argued more broadly with regard to a range of
sectors? Or is this more simply a case of parasitic, opportunity capitalism, fuelled by a
high tolerance for risk in backyard markets that has been somewhat softened by
protective support from the SouthAfrican government? Further evidence is required to
make an assessment concerning Zimbabwean mining’s systematic incorporation into
regional circuits of capital, and the durability of foreign capital’s control in the
changed context of voiced demands from local stakeholders, in a post-crisis era. Here,
a key factor in the restructuring of the mining sector – a weakened, disembedded state –
seems likely to undergo significant changes in the near term. Perhaps the most
important questions which confront researchers in the coming period, therefore, will
revolve around the rehabilitation of the state and its capacity to ensure that national
interests are asserted on the terrain of the minerals sector. In this regard, the prospects
for continuing foreign asset control are confronted by the possibilities of local
resistance and new, more popular forms of empowerment.
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